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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ety of issues recently dealt with by the New York courts. In People
v. Jones, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that al-
though the trial court erred in compelling the defendant to pro-
ceed at his suppression hearing in the absence of counsel, such er-
ror did not require reversal of his convictions. Rather, the court
ordered a de novo suppression hearing as the means of remedying
any prejudice to the defendant.
In Dioguardi v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, restricted a party's right to depose a
nonparty witness. Interpreting CPLR 3101(a)(4), the court held
that a defendant in a medical malpractice action could not depose
the plaintiff's treating physician absent an affirmative showing that
the deposition might yield information not already available from
the medical records or other sources.
In McGowan v. McGowan, another case from the Appellate
Division, Second Department, the court expanded the definition of
"marital property" in the Domestic Relations Law to include an
educational degree acquired during the marriage. The court analo-
gized such an educational degree to a professional license attained
during the marriage and held that, like a license, a degree is sub-
ject to equitable distribution.
Finally, this issue examines the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v.
Amato. The court held that a police vehicle was not a "motor vehi-
cle" for purposes of section 3420(f) of the Insurance law, thereby
relieving New York City of the obligation to provide such vehicles
with uninsured motorist coverage.
It is hoped that the analysis of these issues in The Survey will
be of interest and assistance to the New York practitioner.
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versal although denied his right to counsel at suppression hearing
Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to be repre-
sented by counsel when legal proceedings are instituted against
them.1 Courts have found that this right exists at every critical
stage of the proceedings.2 Furthermore, some courts have held the
I See U.S. CONST. amend VI. The sixth amendment provides in relevant part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence." Id.; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("[iun any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with coun-
sel.") Id.
The sixth amendment requires courts to appoint counsel for indigent defendants
charged with felonies. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). The Gideon
Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel is incorporated in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and hence is binding on the states. Id. at 342-43. In
order for such a provision in the Bill of Rights to be binding on the states, the provision
must be "fundamental and essential to a fair trial." Id. at 342 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 465 (1942)). While concurring with the Betts Court's analysis of the incorporation
doctrine, the Gideon Court overruled Betts in concluding that the guarantee of counsel was
such a fundamental right and was therefore incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
Id. The Gideon Court explained "reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Id. at 344. The
Court, therefore, concluded that both federal and state courts must provide indigent crimi-
nal defendants with counsel. Id. at 345.
2 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165,
385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978); People v. Cooper, 101 App. Div. 2d 1, 7,
475 N.Y.S.2d 660, 665 (4th Dep't 1984). Once a criminal proceeding has passed from an
"investigatory to [a] prosecutorial stage," the accused has a constitutional right to counsel
at all "critical stages" thereafter. Id. "The purpose of [this] 'critical stage' right to counsel"
is to protect the defendant who is "immersed in the intricacies of substantive and proce-
dural criminal law." People v. Ridgeway, 101 App. Div. 2d 555, 560, 476 N.Y.S.2d 940, 944
(4th Dep't 1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 952,
477 N.E.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1985); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932) (defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him."); People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980) (admission into evidence of damaging statements by defendant
while under custodial arrest in absence of counsel is reversible error where defendant specif-
ically requested counsel); People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 436, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1349, 418
N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (1979) ("In every criminal proceeding, a defendant has an absolute right
to be present, with counsel, 'whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to
the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge' ") (quoting Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1933)). The Cunningham court observed: "This court has con-
sistently exercised the highest degree of vigilance in safeguarding the right of an accused to
have the assistance of an attorney at every stage of the legal proceedings against him."
Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d at 207, 400 N.E.2d at 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
Both preliminary hearings and suppression hearings are "critical stages" in the criminal
process. See People v. Hodge, 53 N.Y.2d 313, 318, 423 N.E.2d 1060, 1062, 441 N.Y.S.2d 231,
234 (1981) (preliminary hearing); People v. Speller, 133 App. Div. 2d 865, 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d
418, 419 (2d Dep't 1987) (suppression hearing).
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right to trial counsel so fundamental that its violation does not
subject a conviction to harmless-error analysis, but rather invaria-
bly constitutes reversible error.3 Recently, however, in People v.
Jones,4 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that,
while it was error to compel a defendant to proceed without coun-
sel at his suppression hearing, reversal of his convictions was not
warranted.'
In Jones, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery
and was convicted by a jury of robbery and criminal possession of
a weapon.' Prior to his trial, the defendant moved to have certain
evidence suppressed.7 The court granted a suppression hearing,
but the defendant's assigned counsel failed to appear.8 Neverthe-
less, the hearing proceeded in the absence of defense counsel, and
the trial court denied the defendant's motion.9
After his convictions, the defendant appealed to the Appellate
Division, Second Department. 0 A divided Appellate Division panel
refused to reverse the convictions despite the fact that the trial
court committed an error of constitutional dimension when it pro-
' See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). In Glasser, the Supreme
Court set aside a conviction because the trial court had appointed an attorney to represent
codefendants despite their potentially divergent interests. Id. The Court found that the "de-
gree of prejudice" resulting from the error need not be determined because "[t]he right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Id.; see also People
v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 295-96, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1278, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (1979) (re-
versible error where defense counsel at trial was layman representing himself as attorney).
But cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (violation of right to counsel at pre-
liminary hearing to determine whether to present case to grand jury may be subject to
harmless error analysis); Speller, 133 App. Div. 2d at 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (not necessa-
rily reversible error where right to counsel denied at suppression hearing).
145 App. Div. 2d. 648, 536 N.Y.S.2d 164 (2d Dep't 1988).
5 Id. at 649, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
6 Id. The defendant, Tyrone Jones, "pleaded guilty to attempted robbery.., on condi-
tion that he would receive a sentence concurrent to that imposed upon his conviction" for
robbery and criminal possession of a weapon. Id. at 652, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (Lawrence, J.,
dissenting).
7 Id. at 648-49, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165. The evidence consisted of identification testimony,
certain statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials, and certain physical
evidence. Id.
8 Id. at 649, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165. At the hearing, the court indicated that if the defend-
ant did not agree to proceed in the absence of counsel, his motion to suppress would be
dismissed. Id. at 651, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (Lawrence, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 649, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
10 Id. at 648, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165. The defendant's appeal was based on an alleged
denial of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 650, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 166 (Lawrence, J., dissenting).
1989]
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ceeded with the suppression hearing in the absence of the defend-
ant's attorney.11 The majority relied on the case of People v.
Speller. 2 In Speller, a Second Department case involving similar
facts, the court held that where a defendant is denied the assis-
tance of counsel at a suppression hearing, the appropriate correc-
tive action is to hold the appeal in abeyance and order a de novo
suppression hearing in which the defendant will be represented by
counsel.13 Consequently, the Jones majority upheld the convictions
and ordered a new suppression hearing.14 In dissent, Justice Law-
rence argued that the defendant's convictions should be reversed, 5
asserting that a motion to suppress evidence is a "crucial step"
which often dictates the outcome of a criminal trial.'6 The right to
the assistance of counsel at such a hearing, according to Justice
Lawrence, is "fundamental and absolute."'" The dissent noted that
Jones' statement that he would continue with the suppression
hearing without counsel did not constitute a valid waiver of his
right to counsel.' 8 Furthermore, Justice Lawrence argued that a
deprivation of the defendant's right to counsel at a suppression
hearing is never subject to harmless-error analysis. 9 Consequently,
" Id. at 649, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165. The court stated that the only issue to be addressed
was the "nature of the appropriate corrective action." Id.
12 133 App. Div. 2d 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d 418 (2d Dep't 1987). The Jones court noted that
the argument for reversal was more compelling in Speller, because there the defendant
pleaded guilty after the suppression motion was denied, making it "difficult to gauge" the
influence the denial had on the defendant's decision to plead guilty. Jones, 145 App. Div. 2d
at 650, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 166. Therefore, the court in Jones declared that it was bound by
Speller. Id.
13 See Speller, 133 App. Div. 2d at 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
14 Jones, 145 App. Div. 2d at 650, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 166. Justices Thompson, Weinstein,
and Harwood concurred in the memorandum decision. Id. Justice Lawrence dissented in a
memorandum decision in which Justice Brown concurred. Id. (Lawrence, J., dissenting).
Id. (Lawrence, J., dissenting).
Id. at 650-51, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (Lawrence, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. An-
derson, 16 N.Y.S.2d 282, 287, 213 N.E.2d 445, 447, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1965) (quoting
People v. Lombardi, 18 App. Div. 2d 177, 180, 293 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 13
N.Y.2d 1014, 195 N.E.2d 306, 245 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1963))).
17 Id. at 652, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (Lawrence, J., dissenting) (quoting Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1941)).
's Id. at 651, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (Lawrence, J., dissenting). Justice Lawrence asserted
that "at no time did the hearing court 'ascertain that the [appellant] appreciated the risks
of self-representation.'" Id. (Lawrence, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d
12, 20, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1137, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178
(1983)). In order for a waiver of counsel to be effective, the defendant must waive the right
knowingly and intelligently. See People v. Berdicia, 67 App. Div. 2d 879, 879, 413 N.Y.S.2d
681, 681 (1st Dep't 1979).
9 Jones, 145 App. Div. 2d at 652, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (Lawrence, J., dissenting). See
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the dissent concluded that, since the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated, he was entitled to a new trial preceded by a
new suppression hearing.20
It is submitted that the reasoning employed by Justice Law-
rence in his dissent in Jones properly reflects the predominant
view that the criminal defendant's right to counsel is a fundamen-
tal tenet of our judicial system.21 It is suggested that the majority
deviated from this theory by reasoning that reversal was not war-
ranted where "no determination [was] being made as to whether
the trial court erred in denying suppression. 2 2 Although the ma-
jority did not expressly apply a harmless-error analysis, it implied
that the error was rendered harmless by reasoning that the denial
of the defendant's right to counsel was irrelevant if the decision to
deny the suppression was proper.23 It is proposed that, in effect,
the majority improperly employed a harmless-error analysis in de-
termining the constitutional validity of Jones' convictions when in-
stead it should have applied a per se rule of reversal.24
generally Note, Invalid Waivers of Counsel as Harmless Errors: Judicial Economy or a
Return to Betts v. Brady?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 431, 450 (1987) ("Invalid waivers of counsel
should not be subject to harmless error analysis").
20 Jones, 145 App. Div. 2d at 652, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (Lawrence, J., dissenting). Prior
to Jones, the Court of Appeals had concluded that when inquiry into the effect of depriva-
tion of counsel would amount to "pure speculation," the proper corrective action is to order
a new trial. People v. Hodge, 53 N.Y.2d 313, 321, 423 N.E.2d 1060, 1064, 441 N.Y.S.2d 231,
235 (1981).
21 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932); supra notes 1-2 and accompanying
text. The Powell Court identified the importance of the aid of counsel as follows:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
22 Jones, 145 App. Div. 2d at 649, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
22 See id.
24 Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-23 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme
Court stated that some constitutional errors require automatic reversal while others are sub-
ject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 22. The Court noted three rights "so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Id. at 23. These rights
were (1) freedom from a coerced confession (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. . 560, 561
(1958)); (2) the right to counsel (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)); and
(3) the right to an impartial judge (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)). Id. at 23
n.8. The Court went on to identify the standard to be utilized when and if harmless error
analysis is to be applied to a constitutional error, stating that "before a federal constitu-
tional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24.
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Harmless-error rules were developed to alleviate the number
of reversals of lower court decisions resulting from trivial errors.25
It is suggested, however, that an extension of harmless-error analy-
sis to a violation of a fundamental constitutional right, such as the
right to counsel, is unsupported by both the history of its develop-
ment26 and the weight of authority.2 7 Furthermore, it is also sug-
gested that statutory authority for harmless-error analysis fails to
support its application to the violation of constitutional rights.28
While the goal of harmless-error analysis-conserving judicial re-
sources-is compelling, it is submitted that it does not justify vio-
lating constitutional rights in the process.29
Moreover, it cannot be said that the defendant waived his
right to counsel. Although a criminal defendant has the constitu-
tional right to represent himself in a criminal trial,30 he must do
New York courts have also adhered to the Chapman rule that violation of the right to
counsel should not be subject to harmless error analysis. See People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d
287, 296, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1277-78 418 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (1979); People v. Narayan, 76
App. Div. 2d 604, 612, 431 N.Y.S.2d 556, 561 (2d Dep't 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 54
N.Y.2d 106, 429 N.E.2d 123, 444 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1981). LaFave and Israel identify two types
of analysis to be employed when applying harmless error rules. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 996 (1985). The first deals with structural errors in a pro-
ceeding. Id. If this type of error is violative of a substantive right, it automatically requires a
new trial regardless of the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction. Id. The other
type of analysis relates to evidentiary errors. Id. This is the type of error which traditionally
receives harmless error analysis. Id. It is submitted that the majority erroneously classified
the violation of Jones' right to counsel as within the latter category, when in reality it
should have been classified in the former-a violation of a substantive constitutional
right-and therefore should have resulted in an automatic reversal. See id.
"' See Note, supra note 19, at 438. Harmless error rules serve an important social
function since the reversal of a conviction results in substantial costs to society. See United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986). In Mechanik, Justice Rehnquist noted that re-
versal "forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend fur-
ther time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place."
Id.
28 See supra note 24.
2'7 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
28 See Note, supra note 19, at 438. Today all fifty states have harmless error rules of
some kind. Id. at 439. Both the federal and New York state harmless error statutes provide
that harmless error analysis applies only to those errors not affecting the substantial rights
of the parties. 28 U.S.C.§ 2111 (1982); CPL § 470.05(1) (McKinney 983).
29 See Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
79, 85 (1988). According to the Supreme Court, harmless error analysis promotes the effi-
cient use of judicial resources. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983). "The
goal [of harmless error analysis is to]. . . 'conserve judicial resources by enabling appellate
courts to cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error without becoming mired in harm-
less error.'" Id. (quoting R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970)).
"0 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975); People v. Davis, 49 N.Y.2d 114,
119, 400 N.E.2d 315, 316, 424 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1979).
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so "knowingly and intelligently" in order to effectively waive his
right to counsel.3 ' This requirement for a valid waiver is necessary
to assure that a criminal defendant appreciates the risks of pro-
ceeding pro se.2 As Justice Lawrence pointed out in his dissent,
the defendant's statement that he would proceed with the suppres-
sion hearing clearly was not made "knowingly and intelligently"33
and, therefore, did not meet the requirements for a valid waiver of
counsel.
The Jones court's reliance on the Speller decision by-passed
the opportunity to correct a dangerous precedent in New York law.
In addition, if the court had reversed Jones' convictions, a message
would have been sent out to trial courts that the Appellate Divi-
sion refuses to condone such constitutional violations, thereby de-
terring future transgressions of the right to counsel. It is urged
that by refusing to apply a per se rule of reversal, the Jones court
has paved the way for the future use of harmless-error analysis to
situations where it is clearly inapplicable.
Jacqueline L. Sonner
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 3101(a) (4): To force disclosure of information possessed by
a nonparty witness, the litigant must show that the sought after
" People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844
(1974); see also People v. Williams, 96 App. Div. 2d 740, 740, 465 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (4th
Dep't 1983) (court must determine whether defendant's decision to represent himself was
"knowing and intelligent"). Several statutory provisions authorize the court to permit a de-
fendant to proceed pro se "if it is satisfied that [the defendant] made such a decision with
knowledge of the significance thereof." See CPL § 170.10(6) (information or misdemeanor
complaint), § 180.10(5) (felony complaint), § 210.15(5) (indictment) (McKinney 1982).
" See People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1138, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418,
423 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983). The Sawyer court stated that prior to al-
lowing the defendant to proceed pro se the court should "undertake a sufficiently 'searching
inquiry' of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the 'dangers and disadvantages' of
giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant." Id.
(quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
33 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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